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Throughout my undergraduate career, I have heard 
people say that the liberal arts are worthless. People say 
that you cannot get a job, or they say that most of what you 
study is meaningless. X hear these comments and wonder why 
do people feel this way. If what they say is triie, X had 
certainly better change my course of study. Within the 
study of political science, these criticisms seem to be 
felt as well. The purpose of this paper is to look into this 
lack of respect for the liberal arts with a focus on social 
sciences, especially political science. Xn doing this, I 
will point to a problem within the social sciences that I 
feel is primarily responsible for this notion. X will refer 
to this problem, from here on, as an identity crisis. 
Throughout the paper, X will often refer to the social 
sciences, but in doing so this will assume a focus on poli­
tical science because this is what X am primarily concerned 
with. However, as X thought about this problem, X realised 
that it cut across most of the social sciences especially 
hard.
Ny inquiry is aimed at the identity crisis that seems 
to happen when one refers to the study of politics or society 
as a science. X believe this problem is one of definition 
and history. Xn my defining of science, X have tried to 
capture the true broad nature of this word, and X have, in
I
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2the process, found it necessary to look deeply into the notion 
of knowledge.
With this definition, I chose to move into the heat 
of the topic, and where 1 feel the source of this identity 
crisis emanates from. This is in the historical elevation and 
arrival of industry and technology. It seems to me that at 
this point and as it all progressed, social science came at 
odds with itself by attempting to overly assert itself. Along 
with this came an affiliation with the scientific method used 
in the physical sciences and a disregard for philosophical 
inquiry. Thus the mechanization of the social sciences and 
isolation and stagnation of their subject - human beings.
With this perspective I attempt to look at why this 
conflict persists, and I attempt a hand at a remedy. It may 
seem that through most of this work I am generalizing. How­
ever, I do not intend to do this, and realize fully well that 
this problem is not universal. Yet to explain further, this 
problem is, for rie, a very sensitive one, and should be one 
that all who strive to be political scientists should face. 
Here as I end my undergraduate career and with my desire to 
study further, this problem has been something that I have 
spent a very long time realizing and reflecting upon. I 
believe that this crisis is pressing enough to warrant that 
all who wish to study politics or any social science, should 
understand and recognize this epidemic.
3One of the most important things that must be under­
stood from the onset is that this is a paper on the schisit 
in political science that has been caused by differing views 
on the methods and criteria that should be used to acquire 
meaningful knowledge. I feel that the crux of this problem 
can only be fully seen from this epistemic view. This is a 
bit of a catch-22 because the heart of the problem lies within 
the notion of knowledge. So, from the start, I approach this 
problem philosophically, and in doing so I hope to point out 
the misunderstanding, mishandling and misteaching that is a 
result of an improper understanding of knowledge.
Before we enter the body of this paper, I would like 
to mention that the small number of footnotes in this paper 
is not indicative of a lack of preparation, but rather the 
opposite. As I stated earlier, this is a problem that has 
burdened my thoughts for some time. When 1 began writing,
I realized that I had some very definite thoughts on this 
subject and that they were all influenced by many years of 
reading and discussions with others. I decided early on to 
"pitch my tent” and deliver my op ton on this problem as 
I see it in conjunction with my readings and conversations. 
With this, it should be clear that this paper, from begin­
ning to end, is a work of reflection and philosophical 
inquiry more so than research. However, 1 feel that i have 
been researching this problem most of my academic life by
participating in it. But in order to lend cohesion to this 
inquiry I relied mainly on three texts. These are as 
follows:
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1. Max Weber's essays "Politics as a Vocation" 
and "Science as a Vocation"
2. Eric Voegelin's, The New Science of Politics
3. Leo Straufis' essay, "What is Political 
Philosophy?"
These were the three main texts, but there are many more that 
have influenced this work, which will be mentioned in the 
bibliography.
II
The first question that needs to be addressed is 
one of definition. What is science? Science, like many 
other words that are categorical, that is applying some 
thought or idea into a specific area, can be interpreted and 
defined strictly or liberally. When referring to something 
as a science one must consider this because it influences 
how the topic that is being categorized is received.
Instead of merely rattling off a definition, i': is necessary 
for the present inquiry to build a definition so that the 
reader ca-. fully folio., the train of thought at hand.
First, science cannot be defined by its topic, but 
must only be modified by it. For example, if one were to 
talk about chemical science the notions and laws of chemistry 
would not be the pretense for science but rather the kind of 
science. Within each type of science the topic requires its 
own modes of inquiry. These modes are specific to the 
topic not to science. This idea might seem elementary to 
some but it is a pretext that we sometimes forget as we move 
deeper into our topic within science.
As we look at science, it is necessary to define 
what sort of things it is categorizing. It would be safe to 
say that the science is categorizing different areas of 
knowledge; topical knowledge such as chemistry, physics or
5
6politics. Here we find the strongest requirement for some­
thing to be called a science. This notion of knowledge leads 
us to the root of any science, which is philosophy or theory. 
In order to refer to something as a science it must have a 
theoretical foundation and conceptual models. These theories 
are the transportation by which knowledge is carried, and 
without them concepts would be stagnant and unrooted. Theory 
is the ground floor of any scientific model. It would be 
illogical and virtually impossible to look into any problem 
or question without first having some idea of how this ques­
tion should be answered or addressed. So, thus far in our 
definition we can say that science is a categorical mode of 
topical knowledge, in which each topic has its own specific 
method of inquiry and cannot exist without a theoretical 
foundation. If there is no theory, then there can bn no 
science. (1 )
This necessity for a theoretical foundation to any 
scientific endeavor brings to the forefront the last stipula­
tion of our definition. If a scientist has a theory about 
something, then this points to a certain state of mind.
Having a theory about a question assumes that one has a 
preconceived notion as to what the answer could or should be. 
To what extent does this preclusion dictate itself in the 
method used to investigate the question, and how does this 
effect the ultimate.outcome of the experiment? All people,
7including scientists, have hopes for and ideas of what should 
be. It seems imperative to recognize this natural instinct 
of the human condition. Every scientist carries into his 
method a preconceived set of beliefs and ideas. This must 
necessarily be a part of the scientists method. For 
instance, if one were to be looking into the problem of third 
world countries, one would most likely have certain ideas and 
attitudes already in place before direct inquiry began. (2) 
This would influence the way the scientist collected, invest­
igated and interpreted the data. Here then our definition 
expands to the following final length:
(a) science is a categorical mode of topical 
knowledge, in which each topic has its 
own specific method of inquiry, cannot 
exist without a theoretical foundation, 
and must be aware of the influences that 
human normative reality plays in the 
inquiry.
Here it might seem that I am positing that there is
no real knowledge, that it is all arbitrary and dependent on
the beliefs of the scientist - in a sense that there is no
fact. This could not be farther from the truth. However,
this human factor is a necessary variable that must be
recognized in order to understand the full force of the
question at hand. This human factor is difficult to pin
down, and is not always visible, but it is something that
must be recognized. (3) Also, this human factor is th'
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residue that is present after the scientist attempts to strip
eaway his bias in order to see the problem and experimenta­
tion more clearly. What I am speaking of is that which is 
a part of all human beings, to one extent or another, and is 
inescapable without some sort of schizophrenic condition.
It is necessary to look further at our definition 
of science and its reference to knowledge, ; order to see 
the scientists more clearly. Many believe that knowledge is 
something that is factual and if it is not fact then it is not 
knowledge, and is irrelevant to the pursuit of science. (4) 
These people see the world as a discernable realm of proper­
ties and tendencies that can be emulated and replicated. It 
is these sorts of things that make up knowledge for these 
people. In other words, the world of knowledge is one 
expansive objective organism that is r.on-normative and 
unemotional. This idea could not be further from the truth, 
and this mistaken interpretation of knowledge as pure fact 
is the central germ of this crisis. To see this we must ask 
ourselves why do people pursue knowledge? Is it just to 
possess knowledge or is there some intrinsic worth or good 
in the acquisition of knowledge? It seems that there is an 
intrinsic worth that makes people hunger for reason. All 
people look for the "good" in their own way and those who 
strive for knowledge are motivated by the same urge. This 
human endeavor permeates our whole race. We.strive for "the 
good" in an effort to realize our purest of potentials. The
9myth of progress is firmly planted in this pot, and knowledge
is the root. All of this points to the fact that if one
seeks knowledge then he is seeking "the good." So from the
beginning, the pursuit of knowledge is a normative action
affected by emotion, desire and imagination. A scientist
would not ask a question and research it if he did not feel
a need for the question to be asked. This idea is best
summed up by Leo Strauss:
"The very fact that we can question it 
[knowledge] directs us towards such a 
thought of the good as is no longer 
questionable...if men make it their 
explicit goal to acquire knowledge of 
the good life and of the good society...
Philosophy as quest for wisdom is quest 
for universal knowledge, for knowledge 
of the whole...Philosophy is essentially 
not possession of the truth but quest 
for the truth." (5)
Here we see that knowledge is not merely fact but hope and 
aspiration for "the good," and although Strauss is talking 
about political philosophy, this point nonetheless can be 
applied to science as a whole. The normative reality of 
science is held within our concept of knowledge.
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Now that we have defined science and we see that 
knowledge and science are affected by the human factors 
mentioned above, we can look deeper into the problem at hand. 
At this point it is necessary for us to narrow our scope to 
the social sciences and to political science in particular.
In doing so, it is important to look at the similarities and 
differences that exist between the social sciences and the 
physical sciences.
First, these two categories of science are divided 
as such for a specific reason. The physical sciences mainly 
deal with inanimate objects and forces. These sciences are 
sometimes falsely referred to as the exact science because 
they collect data and analyze it in such a way that lends to 
the seeming exactness of their results. However, as one 
travels deeper into the higher spheres of the physical 
sciences, such as quantum physics, one can see that at this 
level the physical sciences are theoretical and non-exact. 
Also, this seeming exactness of the physical sciences needs 
to be seen as relative to the nature of the subjects it 
deals with. This is to say that the inanimate objects and 
even those which have motion are for the most part stable 
and this lends to the illusion that things can be known 
factually about them.
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Along side the physical sciences come the social 
sciences. These deal with the human condition whose motion 
is perpetuated from within itself as well as from forces 
and tendencies acting upon itself. Historically/ the social 
sciences have been seen as non-exact and less factual. 
However, much like the physical sciences, on the lower levels 
there is knowledge that is exact, such as basic research on 
human appetites.
With these interpretations of these two classifica­
tions one might be able to see how our problem at hand began. 
Since the Newtonian calculus and especially in the twentieth 
century, man has been developing new technologies as a means 
of betterment and as a pursuit towards higher knowledge in 
the physical sciences. As time went on, people started to 
value these technologies as they revolutionized the world and 
life as we knew it. These technologies were mainly developed 
by those in the physical sciences as they grasped for the 
knowledge of these tendencies and forces that could create 
Apparati that would help and better life for mankind. During 
this revolution, the social sciences and questions of human 
society were put into a second, lower level because the work 
and the thinking being done in these areas was not as 
immediately gratifying as the fruits of the physical 
sciences. (6)
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Here we come to the first major tear in the social 
sciences. As people started gaining from the physical 
sciences, people within the social sciences started to 
think that maybe they could make the social sciences more 
exact and thus they could gain back the respect they had 
lost. Social scientists thought that maybe they should 
emulate the methods and attitudes of the physical sciences. 
Here these social scientists made their gravest mistake.
The social scientists were investigators of human existence 
and by adopting these methods of the physical sciences they 
stifled their own inquiry. These methods and models of 
physical science were developed to study inanimate tendencies 
and forces not human social grouping or any aspect of the 
human social condition. The occurrence of this situation 
is mainly responsible for the beginnings of the identity 
crisis that we are speaking of.
It is necessary here to explain why many of these 
things were allowed to happen and remain today. The first, 
most obvious reason is that technology is a physical gratifi­
cation and thus although the physical sciences are theo­
retical as well they are more immediately alluring.
People want more and strive more for the acquisition and 
development of these material technologies. However, now 
the abuse of technology is becoming apparent, For example, 
note nuclear arms and the "T.V." generation. Suddenly, there
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is a need for the social sciences but they cannot respond 
when they are called because they# too# have been duped by 
technology. In a very real sense# the social scientist has 
allowed for much of this by attempting to use the method of 
physical science for so long. In essence# the purpose of 
the social sciences has been abandoned and waylaid by the 
lack of theoretical foundation and method with regard to the 
subject. In saying this I am not suggesting that this problem 
has infected all social scientists but it has to a sufficient 
degree wounded and confused the situation. This sort of 
division in method has caused an identity cricis that has 
disorganized and undermined many parts of the social sciences.
The more subtle and devastating reason for this con­
dition is the social scientists' lack of reflection and 
respect for philosophy. Here I will posit the most important 
point of this inquiry# and this is that before one can be a 
scientist# he must first be a philosopher or theorist. This 
is something that many social scientists have lost and must 
regain. This is the foundation of mankind and the social 
sciences are supposed to be dedicated to those pressing 
questions that mankind has asked of itself since the dawn of 
reason. We have been unnecessarily pulled down by our own 
leanings on technology# and have become intellectually lazy. 
Our theories are put together so that we can.run them through 
our computer programs, and our data is collected and
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interpreted in the same way. We seem to be overly busy with 
forcing this to work while forgetting our prime objective 
which is our foundation. I am not saying that technology 
is bad. I completely believe in the progress of technology.
It can, and does, help the social scientist, but we should 
be using it rather than being used by it. Philosophy and 
theory are the basis for our questions. Unfortunately, we no 
longer read the texts of thinkers themselves, but we pick up 
anthologies and articles interpreting their theories. We have 
come to focus on something that we cannot find because the 
human social condition cannot be interpreted sufficiently 
by suing the methods of another science.
IV
Here I would like to talk a bit more about the human 
factors involved in the scientific endeavor. Throughout 
this failing of the social sciences, we have seriously 
damaged the epistemology that belongs to our notion of 
science. We have tried to say that all knowable things are 
facts, and in doing so we have squelched our subject matter - 
that being human beings. By ignoring the normative reality 
of knowledge we have left the human factor unattended. By 
falsely striving for this factual knowledge we have -ost the 
essence of our vocation. We cannot stand on the shallow 
divisions that Max Weber tries to apply in his essays on 
politics and science as vocations. One cannot pull the 
normative reality of science away from it as Weber does.
The emotions, hopes and imagination of humanity are just 
as much part of the theories as they are of the people that 
these theories apply to.
One thing that lends to this misunderstanding of 
scientific knowledge is the objective view that many social 
scientists take of the world. The mistake comes from the 
misunderstanding of the physical sciences. Much of what is 
studied in the lower parts of the physical sciences is 
fairly objective, such as chemical reactions and gravita­
tional forces. The social scientists have taken this
15
16
objectivity too literally without acknowledging the nature 
of their subjects. With a poor adaptation of this to the 
social we receive an objective perspective of the human 
condition without any recognition of the subjective 
elements, or the "tacit" dimension. This "tacit" side of 
human beings is equally important as the objective, yet too 
often the social scientist ignores this or worse ye‘ tries to 
objectively prove the "tacit" side of human reason and being. 
Here, I am not saying that this "tacit" element is non­
observable but that this knowledge is non-factual. However, 
there is much to gain by knowing and understanding the 
aspects of this area. It seems ridiculous and absurd to 
think that someone might think they could have a part in his 
computer program to answer for "tacit" variables. It might 
be the case that he can isolate characteristics that are 
"tacit" but never could he replicate these tendencies because 
the variable range is infinite.
It is important to give an example of this "tacit" 
side of the human being that must be recognized and not 
distorted into objectivity. Michael Polanyi talks exten- 
siv ely of this in his book, Personal Knowledge. He says:
"...knowledge, as I have defined it is 
not known in itself but is known in terms 
of something focally known...to this extent 
it is unspecifiable.•.It is left to the 
imagination to reconstruct from such exper­
ience the three dimensional picture...and to 
explore mentally its connections with adjoin­
ing unexposed areas around it and below it." (7)
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This subjective element of human existence is what ultimately 
separates the physical sciences from the social sciences.
This is also why it is important for the social scientist 
to develop methods that are sensitive to this perplexing 
and sometimes mysterious part of the human condition. If 
we are to look at the problems in human social existence 
thoroughly and clearly, we must understand these human 
factors.
VAt this point, I would like to turn the scope of 
this inquiry over to the intellectual education of today.
This is the place that allows for this crisis to continue.
The liberal arts, which the social sciences are a part of, 
were conceived with the recognition of the importance of well 
rounded intelligence. It is an assumed by-law that by learn­
ing about a broad body of knowledge that one could more 
effectively cope and interact in this constantly growing 
world of ours. The breadth of these studies was to give 
the student the tools to be a critical thinker, writer and 
speaker. Much of this was found in the Socratic tradition, 
where students were taught to dive deeply into their minds 
and try to work out the problems that face man daily.
However, education, especially in the social sciences, has 
fallen short of this. Today education is based on short term 
memory of factual knowledge on the elementary and high school 
levels and in the college ranks students are given much of 
the same. The university student is given a spectrum of 
tendencies and forces within the social sciences to gauge 
activity and events by. The student is taught in such a 
way that it requires him to act like a machine, and if the 
student is an efficient machine then he receives a good 
grade. Students no longer think things out*on their own.
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They are no longer challenged with those primordial and 
perplexing questions of man, upon which all scientific 
knowledge was conceived. It is here that the social scien­
tists are sealing the tomb that will imprison the minds of 
the future.
In looking at education today, in the social 
sciences, we see the closing of minds, and the cliche 
switch to auto-pilot that is so tempting yet so deadly.
This stale stage of affairs is what allows for much of this 
to continue. It is imperative that the educators of today 
realize this and attempt to remedy this situation. If this 
is truly the land of the free, wouldn't it be appropriate 
to give students the freedom to think for themselves? This 
is not to say that factual knowledge is useless or even less 
important than "tacit" knowledge but people need to realize 
and interpret their own "tacit” situation. This means they 
must think through things rather than memorize facts that 
create a spectrum of measurement that limits and inhibits 
the bounds of knowledge. This limiting is the stifling of 
knowledge, itself, as well as human capabilities.
EPILOGUE
I have attempted to map out a very serious crisis 
that exists in political science today. This crisis is 
something that tears and stagnates the positive movement of 
this science. The science of politics is a science that 
tries to take facts from political situations and interpret 
these via the "tacit" dimension of humanity and society. It 
is most necessarily true that personal and societal exist­
ence is influenced by hope, emotion and imagination. To try 
to examine the human condition without recognition of these 
subjective elements would require the paralysis of the human 
component. In other words, life would be taken out of our 
study and human beings would necessarily become more 
objects. There are some political scientists today who 
believe this is correct and proper. They believe that 
scientific knowledge is one of fact, but this is only a 
part. In aligning oneself with such an epistemology, there 
is no hope to fully understand and investigate the political 
nature of mankind. Only in acknowledging both the objective 
and subjective parts of the political man can a scientist 
hope to observe and analyze man in his natural state of 
motion and life.
There are two main steps that the political scien­
tist can take in order to put him back on the road to
20
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recovery. First, philosophical inquiry needs to be reintro­
duced into the study of politics. This is necessary for 
several reasons, mostly to reintroduce the primordial ques­
tions of man in order to build firmly a theoretical under­
standing of man's nature. This foundation will breathe life 
into any political analysis within any area of politics for 
the mere reason that it calls us to understand more fully the 
nature of our subject. This reintroduction of philosophical 
inquiry is also important because it helps the political 
scientists devise a method of inquiry that answers for his own 
political nature as well as that of his subject.
The second change that must occur is one of the 
educational attitude and policies of political scientists 
today. Educators can no longer require their students to 
correlate facts with a spectrum of preordained theories.
This sort of work is that of a machine. Rather, students 
need to realize that there are many theories that attempt to 
answer questions but what is of foremost importance is that 
they look into and know and question and analyze other 
theories while being critical. The student must be required 
to assimilate his own theories into the plethora of already 
established theories. They must be encouraged to develop 
their own method of inquiry that is consistent with the 
nature of man, both objectively and subjectively.
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Until this identity crisis is under control, 
political science will be divided in such a way that it 
will mutually exclude itself from within. Political scien­
tists need to reevaluate their own method and educational 
techniques. Without this reflection this crisis will con­
tinue. Political scientists need to remember their own 
human condition. They need to ask themselves those primordial 
questions of life that some have seemingly forgotten. Until 
this is done, the science of politics will be a victim of 
its own political and intellectual turmoil.
ENDNOTES
1. Personal Knowledge, Polanyi, Michael. These comments 
mainly influenced by the first two sections of this 
book entitled wThe Art of Knowing" and "The Tacit 
Component."
2. Ibid. Polyani speaks at length about the creativity of 
the scientist and how this effects his experimentation. 
This is important because it hints to the normative 
nature of knowledge.
3. Ibid.
4. "What is Political Philosophy?", Strauss, Leo. Leo 
Strauss talks about opinion and knowledge in conjunction 
with political philosophy. He points out that this sort 
of knowledge is 'knowledge to the good.' This points
to the normative value of knowledge. Some of Polanyi's 
comments lend to the basis of this point as well.
5. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
6. The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution,
Jacob, Margaret. Paul Davies1 book/ (Soct and the"~New 
Physics was also influential.
7. Personal Knowledge, Polanyi, Michael, pp. 88-89.
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